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Report prepared for the Executive Director, NSW Bus and Coach Association. The opportunity to
present an earlier draft to the BCA on Monday 31 May is appreciated. The comments and discussion
have helped to clarify the arguments.
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Introduction
1. There is a growing interest in Australia, especially by regulators, in identifying what role
head-on and/or potential competition amongst bus operators plays in servicing a local area.
Although competition between bus services and other forms of transport already exists, the
current interest is on competition between bus services for the same population of potential
patronage. Under the 1990 Passenger Transport Act, head-on competition between local bus
operators does not exist. The primary motivation for government involvement in NSW is to
ensure that a minimum level of service is provided at prices not exceeding an industry-agreed
maximum fare, and with vehicles of adequate quality as specified by an upper limit on the
average age of the operator's fleet. Any additional service above the minimum is encouraged as
good commercial practice, as is the desire to provide these services in the most cost efficient
way.
2. Under the current arrangements for the supply of local urban bus services, an operator
complying with the requirements set out under the 1990 Passenger Transport Act is given a
contract for 5 years in the first instance which entitles the operator to be the sole supplier of
local bus services within the predefined locality. Given the good relative performance of the
majority of incumbents in the past, each incumbent did not have to bid competitively for the
right to provide services. However, in the future, competitive tendering will occur where an
incumbent operator fails to comply with the requirements of the Act or for other reasons
chooses to cease operations. There is no plan at present to introduce competitive tendering
after 5 years where an incumbent complies.
3. This has led to questions being asked by government officials and others about the extent to
which the current contractual arrangements actually engender a sufficient threat of potential
competition from operators not currently competing with an incumbent in order for the current
contracting procedures to be truly contestable contracts.  It has also lead to an interest in
establishing the extent to which areawide local bus operations are a natural monopoly as might
be implied under the existing contractual arrangements. What we do not know is the extent to
which the market is contestable and/or is characterised by natural monopoly. In order to
answer these questions we must have clear definitions of contestability and natural monopoly.
Before presenting formal definitions we need to be clear about the underlying objective of
government policy which motivates government involvement.
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The Objective: Constrained Maximisation of Social Welfare
4. The underlying objective driving government involvement is to ensure that the welfare of
the community is maximised. This objective can be translated into a pricing strategy which will
if implemented properly ensure that services are provided at prices which maximise social
welfare. There are two social welfare pricing strategies  (i) unconstrained social welfare
maximisation and (ii) constrained social welfare maximisation. The latter is of particular
interest to us. Constrained social welfare maximisation says that prices should be set at a level
at which demand for services is determined subject to the operator covering their average
costs including an acceptable return on investment. There would be no subsidy to the operator.
In contrast unconstrained social welfare maximisation tends to lead to lower prices than those
covering average costs, and hence requires sizeable subsidy. The idea of a community service
obligation (CSO) is derived from the gap between constrained and unconstrained social
welfare maximisation, placing the onus on the government to decide if a non-commercial
service should continue as a CSO.
5. The following discussion of contestability must be placed within an environment of
constrained social welfare maximisation where an operator earning above-normal profits (i.e.
more than covering their average costs and an acceptable return on investment) will attract
potential competition into the actual market. If a natural monopoly exists then only one
operator will survive in the market.
6. Economic deregulation, however, is more attuned to profit maximisation than social welfare
maximisation as highlighted by the need for government in the UK (outside of London) to step
in and infill services justified on community service obligation grounds which have disappeared
as a result of unfettered competition.  Under economic deregulation there is no guarantee of
socially desirable minimum levels of service or maximum fares.
A Brief Definition of Contestability in its Strict Economic Interpretation
7. Briefly, a contestable market in its strict definition is a market in which there are potential
entrants whose costs of entry and exit are zero, enabling them to adopt hit-and-run behaviour
whenever the incumbent shows any signs of making above-normal profits. Above-normal
profits exist when an operator is more than covering the average costs including an acceptable
return on investment. This pure definition has also been referred to as ultra-free entry (further
discussion is given below). If the market is stric ly contestable then the current arrangements
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ensure that a monopolist acts in the way it would act if faced with effective potential
competition. The restrictions placed on fares and minimum service levels under the 1990 Act
which are beyond the control of a particular operator would have to be equivalent to the
outcome of an ultra-free entry model of market behaviour if one is to refer to the 1990 Act as
strictly replicating the outcomes of competitive forces. If we might expect lower fares than the
maximum in the presence of potential competition, the upper limit on fares is not anti-
competitive in a contestable market unless operators opt for the maximum fare without any
consideration of potential competition. The deviation between maximum fares and fares
consistent with constrained social welfare maximisation is one indicator of violation of pure
contestability. The extent to which individual operators set fares below the maximum is clearly
important in the discussion.
A Brief Definition and Interpretation of a Natural Monopoly
8. A natural monopoly exists where one or more of the following effects exist: economies of
scale, economies of scope and conomies of network integrity. Economies of scale in its very
strict definition exist where the average cost of production falls as output expands (often called
increasing returns to scale or decreasing costs). Output under the definition of scale is assumed
to be homogeneous (i.e. vehicle kilometres or passengers carried on only permanent school
contract or local scheduled route services). When one starts looking at the implications of a
diversified portfolio of services as is the case for most private operators, we talk of ec nomi s
of scope. One can demonstrate positive economies of scope by reducing total costs through
supplying a diversified set of services (e.g. vehicle kilometres of permanent school contract,
charter/tours and local scheduled route services) while holding total service levels fixed
compared to supplying the same level of vehicle kilometres with one type of service (e.g. only
local scheduled route services).
9. Positive economies of network integrity arise because of the opportunity, within a natural
monopoly context, to provide a more integrated service within an area than that provided by
more than one operator. Both economies of network integrity and scope are also linked to the
ability to share some costs between different services which is lost when services are provided
by separate operators. The issue of shared costs often gets confused with internal cross-
subsidy (see paragraph 12). When one broadens the definition of economies of scale and
network integrity to include the benefits to users in the form of lower user c sts (i.e. waiting
times, service uncertainty) with increasing patronage (which is more likely with a single
operator), we see an additional benefit of a natural monopoly.
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10. Economies of scale can thus be due to increased benefits to users as measured by reduced
user cost, even if the costs to the operator of providing the service do not fall. Given that the
local bus industry is typically one of constant returns to scale, it is the user cost benefit which
supports the idea of a natural monopoly. The possible operating environments are summarised
in Figure 1.
Na tu ral  M o no po ly
Yes No
Contestable
market
Non-contestable
market
Non-contestable
market
Contestable
market
Potential
competition
Price and quality
controls (1990
Act)
Potential and
actual competition
Actual
competition
• levels of service
• fares
• average fleet age
• minimum levels
of  service
• maximum fares
• average fleet age
vs
Degree of
association
Figure 1.  Alternative Relationships between Natural Monopoly and Contestability
In order to progress the discussion of natural monopoly and contestability, it is important to
introduce three additional economic concepts: internal cross subsidy, avoidable costs and
shared costs.
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Avoidable and Shared Costs Defined
11. Economic costs are usefully divided into avoidable and shared costs. The Avoidable Costs
of a service are those costs which could be saved if the services were to be reduced to some
specified level or withdrawn entirely. Conversely the avoidable costs are the additional cost
outlays incurred if a service were expanded or introduced from scratch. Each service no
matter what its nature (e.g. a nightride contract or all permanent school contracts or a
particular scheduled route service), will have its own avoidable costs. However there may be
extra costs shared between two or more services which can only be eliminated if both services
are withdrawn. These are defined as Shared Costs.  This distinction is important when
discussing internal cross-subsidy. It is also important when identifying the costs associated
with any change in a particular service.
Internal Cross-Subsidy
12. Internal cross-subsidy in its simplest definition is assumed to occur where the revenue from
one activity is used to fund another activity whose costs would not otherwise be covered.
However where shared costs exist, as is common in local bus transportation, the simple
definition is potentially quite ambiguous. There may be confusion in the literature between
internal cross-subsidy and shared costs. The former can unambiguously be associated with a
particular service not covering its avoidable costs and being cross-subsidised by a service
which more than covers its avoidable costs. A non-zero internal cross-subsidy can be argued
and justified as consistent with rules of overall constrained social welfare maximisation where
there are substantial sh red costs between types of services offered (e.g. school runs and
scheduled services), since there is no widely accepted rule on how shared costs should be
assigned to each activity. Network integrity linked to shared costs is a major user benefit (e.g.
allowing easy transfer and the ability of school children to move from say permanent school
contract services to scheduled route services). Since the allocation of shared costs is quite
ambiguous (there being no unequivocally acceptable rules for sharing these costs), then the
determination of presence of real internal cross-subsidy is itself ambiguous except to the extent
that avoidable costs of particular services are not being covered.
The Key Issue Summarised
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13. With the important definitions now set out, the interest herein is in establishing the extent
to which effective competition requires competition in the l cal bus market in contrast to
competition for the local bus market. A market is deemed contestable where there are
sufficient potential entrants willing to enter a market, but are holding back for various reasons
including the natural monopoly argument - namely that the market is such that there are
economies of scale and/or scope and/or route service integrity to support the presence of only
one operator in the market charging efficient prices which reflect the lowest average cost of
service provision.
Contestability in a Little More Detail (Optional)
14. This section can be skipped by those who might find the more specialised economic
argument difficult to follow. The essential definition of contestability has already been
provided in paragraph 7.
15. The theory of contestable markets revolves around the idea that the competitive pressures
required for efficient provision of service to the community can come from outside. The key is
an ability to contest for a market rather than to compete within it. The ability to contest
depends upon the ease with which a bus operator can enter and xi  from a market without
cost, which in turn depends particularly on whether capital is mobile or irretrievably committed
to producing a particular service.
16. The theory argues that the power of a bus operator to extract monopoly rents (i.e. profits
above a normal level of profit, the latter including an allowance for an acceptable return on
investment), depends upon the extent to which service stems from immobile capital (i.e. capital
which cannot be used elsewhere); that is the extent to which the fixed costs of service
provision are also 'sunk' costs. Sunk costs are defined as costs facing a potential entrant which
do not have to be paid once more by the incumbent; to the potential entrant they constitute a
barrier to entry. On the other hand if all capital is saleable and reusable in alternative markets
without loss (other than that corresponding to normal depreciation in use), a potential entrant
can then replicate, without penalty, the cost and output levels of the incumbent operator.
Consequently a bus industry without sunk costs - even if a natural monopoly - is said to be a
perfectly contestable industry; the possibility of entry by rival firms is always a constant threat.
17. The ability to contest a market in these circumstances has a number of important
consequences in terms of the economic welfare of the community, the primary interest of
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government. These are summarised below. Under the strict definition of a contestable market
in which constrained social welfare maximisation is the objective:
a. A contestable market in the long run never offers more than a normal rate of profit. The
existence of temporary above-normal profits will attract rival operators willing to offer the
same level of service at lower prices. Consequently a monopolist whose position in the market
is perfectly contestable, will earn zero economic rent.
b. Inefficiencies in the way that labour, fuel, capital, materials and management expertise are
used to produce a given level of service (i.e. not at the lowest cost) will be absent in the long-
run. Unnecessary cost provides an invitation to entry: 'someone else can do the same job at a
lower cost'.
c. In the long-run no service provided in a contestable market can be provided at a price less
than its marginal cost. Marginal cost represents the change in total cost which results when
service is varied. At the margin (i.e. adding a route, removing a route), the change in cost is
not usually equal to the average cost of running a business. A price less than its marginal cost
will allow a rival operator to enter the market and offer a reduced service at a slightly lower
price and yet, by eliminating the unprofitable marginal service, earn at least as much as the
incumbent. That is, a price less than marginal cost can be used as a weapon of anti-competitive
behaviour to use cross-subsidy to force someone out of all markets. Consequently in the long-
run cross-subsidies and predatory pricing practices are infeasible.
d. If a market has two or more operators supplying a service, in the long run, prices cannot
exceed marginal cost. There is one exception in the case of a monopolist. It may be s ible
for a (natural) monopolist's price to exceed marginal cost if the average cost of satisfying a
given level of demand is falling as the quantity of service demanded increases. This is typically
at quite low levels of service. A natural monopoly can exist where the technology of supply
makes a single firm the least cost way of providing a service (see paragraphs 7-9). The
technology of supply refers to the way in which a single operator can use his inputs (i.e.
labour, fuel, vehicles etc.) to service the market. This statement is the essence of the argument
in defence of the position that local urban bus operations are a natural monopoly, and that the
case for protecting the community from excess-profits is real, and is executed through the
setting of maximum fares if contestability is absent.
Benchmark Contestability
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18. We would like to think that the set of fares actually charged by operators up to the
maximum fare represents the price associated with constrained social welfare maximisation.
Empirical confirmation of this is extremely difficult without a number of controlled
experiments, or the availability of evidence from existing services subject to contestability.
While we report the experiences in the U.K. outside of London (see below), there is always
the concern about the full transferability of experiences as applicable to NSW. What we can
say with some confidence is that there are various ways of interpreting contestability: (i) the
traditional interpretation of potential competition for the same service area, which might be
described as the original strict economic definition of contestability, (ii) the threat to survival
and resulting competitive tendering due to industry benchmarks changing as a consequence of
'better local performers' changing the yardsticks so that some incumbents can no longer
provide a service complying with revised minimum levels of service and maximum fares; and
(iii) (less importantly) acquired evidence from overseas of achievable service improvements
influencing the revision of price and quality controls - what might be referred to as the
international bandwagon effect.
19. In paragraph 17 we introduced the concept, benchmark contestability. It is introduced
herein as an appropriate interpretation of a way that innovative practices of incumbent
operators under a natural territorial monopoly will work to improve the efficiency of the
industry as a whole. This has been referred to as yardstick competition in some literature and
is understood by the NSW Department of Transport as compe ition among operators.
20. The essence of benchmark contestability is the use of best practice markers and
performance indicators to provide a threat to all operators via the revision that occurs to price
and quality controls as a consequence of improved practices in the industry. We prefer the use
of the term contestable than competition because the former highlights the fact that the
competition is potential in that an operator who cannot adjust performance to conform with
any revision of price and quality levels will encourage competitive entry via competitive
tendering. The minimum levels of service are likely to be revised upwards as a consequence of
innovative practices and improvements in cost efficiency.
21. As regards maximum fares, in NSW this is being linked in the future to the prices tribunal
formula for price regulation known as CPI-X, which allows a franchised operator to raise its
fares each year in line with the general level of inflation (as measured by the consumer price
index or the CPI) less a fixed amount X which reflects productivity improvements.  Benchmark
contestability provides a way of avoiding the manipulation problems of revising X in CPI-X
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price regulation. Under a benchmark contestability rule, the X would not depend on a
particular operator's own performance but rather on the performance of a similar operator in a
different erritorial market. Benchmark contestability would select an X bas d on productivity
improvements achievable by best practice operators after making reasonable adjustment to
control for any particular factors which may be difficult to transfer to the industry as a whole
which could discriminate in a way that might lead to bankruptcy rather than efficiency.
22. In NSW, benchmark contestability appears to exist in the following sense only: under the
1990 Act, the government together with the bus and coach industry developed a set of
minimum levels of service quality (quality controls) and a maximum fare level (price control)
using historical practice as the benchmark. It was recognised that an historical benchmark may
not be indicative of a contestable benchmark level. That is, there is a need to allow the
historical benchmarks to evolve (some would say become a moving target) in a way which
moves the industry closer towards a set of price and quality controls which replicate the
outcomes consistent with constrained social welfare maximisation. The evolution under
benchmark contestability occurs through improved practices of operators. The government
regulator must monitor the changing profile of industry performance in order to identify the
nature and extent of productivity gain over time so that this is a mechanism for reviewing and
changing the minimum levels of service and maximum fares. The regulator's as custodians of
competition policy must ensure that the number of operator's through take-over/merger does
not diminish to a level which threatens the viability of benchmarking. The importance of
monitoring of overall productivity becomes critical to this process. The recent study of urban
bus operator performance undertaken by the Institute of Transport Studies for the Industry
Commission (Hensher and Daniels 1993) provides the appropriate framework for an ongoing
monitoring process.
The Evidence on Natural Monopoly and Contestability
23. There have been a number of important monitoring exercises in the British context
designed to evaluate the benefits and costs of competitive tendering and economic
deregulation. The most notable studies are by Evans (1990a,b and 1991), Preston (1991,
1993), and White (1990). In drawing on the ongoing British experience we have to recognise
that there was not historically a well established set of private sector incumbents to give the
market a head start, in contrast to the NSW situation.
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24. When considering the case of a natural monopoly, we have to take into account operating
costs as well as user cost and service integrity. The case for or against a natural monopoly
should not rest solely with the narrow operator cost exposition that a natural monopoly exists
where the total cost of supplying a service is lower if the service is supplied by one operator
rather than a number of operators. This may well be the context in which some commentators
rest their case. This is linked to the scale argument, and typically draws on economic studies
which conclude that local bus services exhibit approximately constant returns to scale for the
broad range of firm sizes. Firm size (with no allowance for network integrity) is used in these
studies as the only quantitative measure of scale. The British experience has found no evidence
to support the natural monopoly argument on the grounds of operator size.
25. Size however does not capture scope and network integrity. The opportunity to develop
different types of networks (associated with the phenomenon of economies of density or
integrity of service) raises a totally different argument. A single operator may be able to
provide a better service to passengers than several operators using the same combined
resources. A 'better service' is one with lower average user costs (Evans 1990a, page 263).
With a greater prospect of attracting patronage to one's services, a single operator can
schedule more integrated and hence convenient services than the combined schedules of more
than one operator. Connections could be more convenient as well as ticketing (although  inter-
operator ticketing could be envisioned, but it would be rather messy) and information
dissemination. This is not the same as inter-modal ticketing between monopoly bus operators
serving different unique locations, such as exists currently in Sydney between a private
operator and the State Transit Authority.
26. The local bus industry has characteristics which suggest that the savings from economies
of scope outweigh the costs of any monopoly power. Yet under a competition policy driven by
constrained social welfare maximisation, benchmark contestability, price and quality controls,
any monopoly power in practice will either be absent or being progressively eliminated over
time. The success will depend on the effectiveness of the instruments currently in place which
represent competition policy under constrained social welfare maximisation.
27. After three years of economic deregulation in the U.K., outside of London, urban bus
service integration has proven difficult. Scheduled headways are more haphazard on
competitive routes than on monopoly-operated routes. Hence average passenger waiting times
are longer than they need be in relation to the frequency provided. Another way of saying this
is that current average waiting times could be achieved with fewer resources if the services
were better integrated. There exist economies of service integration.  The quality of overall
output is important.
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28. The increased bus kilometres offered by deregulation has not been matched by increased
patronage. It has remained almost static overall. The reasons given for this are:
a. Scheduling inefficiency has led to wasted bus kilometres, and
b. Competing services are inconvenient for passengers in other ways: haphazard
headways are difficult to remember, complete information may be less readily
available, competing schedules are frequently changed, competing buses are
more likely to run off-schedule, and tickets of competing operators are not inter
available.
29. A well known economist, Professor Herb Mohring (University of Minnesota) has argued
that bus routes have economies of scale because user costs fall with increasing patronage
even if the costs of providing the service do not. This generates the case for subsidy to
encourage more frequent services, provided we have economically efficient fares under social
welfare maximisation or average-cost recovery fares under constrained social welfare
maximisation. Since user costs (i.e the fare, walking, waiting and linehaul time) represent a
significant component of the total cost of a typical local urban bus trip (than say for example
they do for airline trips), the importance of user costs in the final determination must be given
great importance. Integration directly affects these user costs, which must be weighed against
competition in the assessment.
30. Preston (1993) in a comprehensive analysis of competition policy in the British bus
industry, suggests that when user costs are taken into account (i.e. the Mohring effect), there
may be some basis for describing the industry as a case for a strong natu al monopoly because
marginal cost pricing will lead to deficits. It is worth noting however that the natural
monopoly applies to local scheduled route services and school services, but excludes charters
and tours except to the extent that this last category contributes to positive economies of
scope (which are separate from the network integrity effect).
31. Since the evidence points towards economies of integration, and that competitive route
services are less convenient for passengers than a service of a single operator using the same
resources, there is appealing evidence that local urban bus operations at the area level are
natural monopolies. Importantly also, in spite of the removal of legal barriers to competition in
the U.K., most local urban bus services have remained as monopolies (with some adjustment
during the three years with operators entering and leaving various markets).
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32. The local bus industry is not directly perfectly contestable. There are barriers to entry in
the form of economies of experience of management and staff, local goodwill, and differential
access to financing arrangements for assets.
Conclusions
33. It is propounded that local urban bus services at the route level have the essential
characteristics of a natural monopoly. The key feature is the value of service integration.
34. There are two ways of representing contestability: (i) direct contestability and (ii)
benchmark contestability.
35. Direct contestability is the ability of potential entrants to enter a market where the
incumbent makes above-normal profits through high fares and/or low levels of service which
create above-normal profits, and through competing with the incumbent in a natural monopoly
setting, lead to either the exit of the incumbent or the exit of the new entrant. The latter is
described as hit-and-run entry in the contestability literature. Zero sunk costs are assumed.
36. Benchmark contestability involves the use of industry best-practice as a mechanism for
adjusting levels of service and maximum fares. Any changes to price controls are linked to
productivity improvements after allowing for the general level of inflation.
37. Benchmark contestability combined with competitive tendering in the presence of non-
compliance under the 1990 Act combines the benefits of integration with at least some
(indirect) "competitive" pressure on operators.
38. If local area bus services were directly contestable less intervention would be required
because (natural) monopoly incumbents would always be effectively threatened by potential
entrants. The evidence in the U.K. where bus services are now deregulated, is that they are not
directly contestable in the economic sense and are highly monopolised (Evans 1990a). There
are barriers to entry.  In this situation there seems little to prevent the operators from
exploiting their monopolies.
39. In the absence of direct contestability from potential entrants, public intervention is likely
to be required to prevent (natural) monopoly operators from exploiting users. Minimum levels
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of service and maximum fares are strategies consistent with this position. Benchmark
contestability combined with competitive tendering provides a way of encouraging efficient
practices and ongoing improvements in performance with the ultimate sanction of competitive
tendering when an operator fails to comply with the ever-moving price and quality controls.
40. The hand of the regulator must be invoked to replicate the ideals of contestability.
41. This is precisely what the spirit of the NSW 1990 Passenger Transport Act represents.
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